In the matter of V v L (1575/2021) [2022] ZAFSHC 284 (21 October 2022), the court granted primary residence of a three-year-old child to the father. The court also expressed, that it is not bound to adhere to the recommendations of the Office of the Family Advocate and that the child’s physical, intellectual, moral, emotional stability, security and safety with the father trumped the fact that the mother should be regarded as the primary caregiver.
The application involved the parental responsibilities and rights of the Applicant (the father) and the Respondent (the mother) over their two (2) year old minor child (“the minor child”), born on 11 February 2019.
BACKGROUND
The Applicant and the Respondent were involved in a love relationship in 2018. During the course of that year, they lived together, but they were not married. The Respondent fell pregnant, and the minor child was born on 11 February 2019. The Applicant in terms of Section 21 of the Children’s Act Act 38 of 2005, hereafter to be referred to as “the Children’s Act” obtained parental responsibilities and rights. The relationship ended in 2019, presumably due to the Respondent stealing about sixty thousand rand (R60 000,00) belonging to the Applicant. The Respondent moved out of the communal home during the course of the year 2020. Subsequent to the Respondent having moved out, the parties structured a parenting plan regarding contact rights of the Applicant. However, despite the structured parenting plan being in place, the Respondent frustrated the Applicant’s contact rights.
The Applicant then approached the Children’s Court for assistance. The court on 19 March 2021 ordered as follows:
“2.1 The applicant shall enjoy contact to the child who shall visit him every alternative week for full week at a time (sic) ie 7 days commencing Friday 15:00 to the following Sunday 15h00 whereupon the child will be returned to the Respondent by the Applicant.
2.2 The visit will start this Friday, 19th March 2022 and the applicant shall fetch the Child from the respondent’s custody and receive into his care for the duration of the contact ordered.
2.3 The parent not having physical custody of the child during the child’s visit with the other parent for that respective week shall be entitled to telephonic/video contact with child between 18h00 – 19h00 daily.
2.4 The parent not having physical custody of the child during the child’s visit with the other parent for that respective week in the event of (sic) the any of the applicant, respondent or child’s celebrating their birthday, (sic) fathers or mother’s day as the case may be, shall be entitled to 4 hours contact for such occasion.
2.5 The applicant is responsible for the transfer of the child to and from him for all visits.
Failure to adhere to this order may result in contempt and or criminal offence.”
After the Children’s Court order was issued, the Applicant proceeded to exercise contact with the minor child, albeit the frustrations of contact created by the Respondent. During the course of April 2021, the Respondent moved to Gqeberha, without informing the Applicant. The Applicant continued to experience frustrations of his contact rights with the minor child. The Applicant approached the High Court in Bloemfontein and the Respondent was ordered to return the minor child from Gqeberha to Bethlehem.
The parties had countless applications since their relationship ended. The applications include the one which was before the Children’s Court and the Maintenance Court in Bethlehem, including approaching the Magistrate’s Court in Qqeberha to enforce the Bethlehem Court Order. As well as an urgent application.
The Court in this matter, had to determine the minor child’s primary residence and whether or not it was in the minor child’s best interest to be in a shared residence which was more or less 800 km apart, this being the distance between Gqeberha and Bethlehem. The Applicant’s rights as an unmarried father were already determined by the Children’s Court in Bethlehem.
Counsel on behalf of the Applicant argued that the report of the Family Advocate was biased and misleading and did not investigate the living arrangements of the Respondent. The Respondent was said to be living in a garage that was converted into a single room. It was furthermore submitted by Counsel that blood tests of the Respondent did not deal in detail on the drug allegations, made against him as liver function tests and hair follicle tests were not done. Counsel argued that the Family Advocate did not deal with the six different places that the Respondent has been moving to nor did the Family Advocate’s report dealt with the allegations of the use of anti-depressants, suicide threats, parental alienation etc. Counsel argued that the Applicant was the more stable parent and that it was in the best interest of the minor child that she be placed in the primary care and residence of the Applicant.
Counsel on behalf of the Respondent argued that the Family Advocate’s report was in the minor child’s best interest. The Applicant relied on his parents to look after the minor child and argued that the minor child was emotionally attached to the Respondent. In as far as the residence of the Respondent was concerned, Counsel argued that the Respondent provided the minor child with what she could afford and that there was nothing wrong with living in a garage dwelling. Counsel argued further that the Respondent went for an alcohol test and went on a parenting skills course as opposed to the Applicant who had his father arranged parenting skills sessions.
The Applicant’s contention was that the Respondent was frustrating his contact rights with the minor child since they separated, that she was unstable and had moved with the minor child from one place to another five (5) times. The Applicant accused the Respondent of negligently leaving the minor child at a settlement area with her seventy-five (75) year old father. The Respondent in her answering affidavit denied these allegations.
SECTION 21 OF THE CHILDREN’S ACT – UNMARRIED FATHER
The Applicant as an unmarried father, had his parental responsibilities and rights confirmed by the Children’s Court and this was not disputed. The Applicant met the requirements as envisaged in section 21 of the Children’s Act. The Court based its decision on the report of the Family Advocate indicating that the Applicant met the requirements of section 21(4). Therefore the Applicant’s parental responsibilities and rights were not in dispute.
ROLE OF THE FAMILY ADVOCATE
The role and mandate of the Family Advocate is trite and clearly set out in Mediation in Certain Divorce Matters Act 24 of 1987 as amended. It plays an significant role in determining and presenting the minor child’s views to court. See Brown v O K Abrahams & Others [2004] 1 JDR 0011 (C) at 414 -424 and when conducting an investigation, it has to take into account all evidence provided by the parties and to promote the best interest of all minor children. In this case the minor child’s best interest in respect of primary care, residence and contact were severely disputed by the parents, the Applicant and the Respondent. In Soller NO v G, 2003 (5) SA 430 (W) Satchwell, J stated as follows: “The Family Advocate provides a professional and neutral channel of communication between the conflicting parents (and perhaps the child) and the judicial officer.”
The Family Advocate may not take sides or attempt to usurp the court’s discretion. The court is required to take into consideration any report produced by the Family Advocate, but is not bound by the recommendations of the Family Advocate.
The First Family Advocate’s report of 3 September 2021 at paragraph 9.3, stated as follows:
“The relocation of the Respondent and the minor child resulted in the Applicant not being able to exercise (regular) daily contact with the minor child as the position was when they all resided within the Bethlehem district. The undersigned is of the view that this cannot be seen to be used as a yardstick to fault the Respondent with. The manner in which the Respondent relocated and withheld certain information from the Applicant, was already viewed as contact frustration.”
The Family Advocate went further at paragraph 10.3.2 and recommended as follows:
“Contact for one long weekend per month where the Applicant exercise contact with the minor child from the Thursday to the Monday. It is recommended that the parties meet each other halfway in order to assist with curbing travelling costs. Possible place for handover could be Gariepdam or Colesberg.”
The Applicant took issue with the report, as the investigation in respect of the residence of the Respondent was not conducted, including the alcohol and suicide allegations. The Court then ordered the Family Advocate to urgently supplemented its report.
The supplementary report indicated that due to the minor child’s tender age, the Family Counsellor could not conduct a formal assessment, but instead conducted an informal observation of the child’s interaction with both parents. Section 10 of the Children’s Act 38 2005 provides for every child to participate in any matter concerning the child’s rights and to express his/her views.
The Family Advocate made the following observations:
“6.3.2 During the interaction with the mother, there was a positive interaction between the mother and the child.” At paragraph 6.3.3, the report indicated that after fifteen minutes the child was looking for the father and the mother could not keep her attention any longer.
The Family Advocate took into consideration the different collateral information obtained from the parties that were involved with the assessment of the Applicant, as well as the Respondent and concluded that it was in the minor child’s best interest that primary residence be with the Respondent, based on the fact that the child had a stronger emotional bond with the Respondent.
The supplementary report also highlighted the high levels of conflict between the parties; the parent’s inability to communicate effectively; the minor child’s exposure to the parent’s conflict and hostile relationship, “there is no longer time to waste and the minor child needs to be put in a situation where stability and security is of the utmost importance to ensure that her development needs are met.”
The report concluded that the minor child’s best interests would be served if she was placed in the primary care and residence of the Respondent. The Judge was of the view that the report was one sided.
The Respondent also provided a report from FAMSA which also did not obtain the expressed view of the Applicant, the report also concluded that:
“we discussed how she and the other parent would go forward in co-parenting, bearing the best interests of the minor child concerned.”
The Judge was of the view that even if the parties attended separate sessions, the common issue that would come out of this was that there was high conflict between them. It seemed that none was prepared to compromise for the sake of the minor child. The Judge stated: “It would be ideal if both as parents to the minor child could have parenting skills methods to assist in minimising their conflict and work together in the best interest of the minor child. The Family Advocate’s report indicate the same issue of both parents’ failure to work together. These separate sessions the parties attended, are just a confirmation that their conflict will not be ending anytime soon. Both the Applicant and the Respondent must realise that the conflict imposed on each other, will have a negative impact on their minor child, be it her self-esteem, mental and physical well-being. It is therefore imperative that they resolve the conflict”. In the court’s view, if the parties’ conflict continued unabated over a child who was only three (3) years, the Court would have no option, but to appoint a legal representative in terms of section 55 of the Children’s Act which provides as follows:
“That if the court is of the opinion that it would be in the best interest of the child to have legal representation, the Court must refer the matter to the Legal Aid Board.”
ISSUES IN DISPUTE
The Applicant submitted a memory stick with different videos involving the interactions between himself and the minor child and interactions between the Respondent and the minor child. Most of the recordings were done by the Applicant. The Judge watched these videos and certain observations were made.
The first video revealed the Respondent talking with the minor child on a video call. The second video revealed the Applicant at the gate of the residence of the Respondent and the Respondent declining to open the gate. Two more videos demonstrated the Applicant in the vehicle with the minor child and the minor child was on a video call with the Respondent. The next video revealed the Applicant playing with the minor child while waiting for the Respondent and in this instance, the parties had an easy engagement, there was no conflict. The Judge stated: “If the parties were able to have one engagement or interaction without conflict, I have no doubt that with a positive attitude from both sides, the parties will be able to relate as adults and as parents”.
However, another video revealed that after such a matured exchange of he minor child in the previous video, the conflict surfaced yet again. Both parties could not agree over the collection of the minor child. The Respondent declined to release the minor child, saying that she did not know where the Applicant was taking the minor child. This kind of disagreement was a setback according to the judge.
The parties could easily agree on the issues in dispute, but because of their constant conflict, it was difficult for them to agree on things that did not need to be argued on. The Judge remarked: “For example, the Applicant could have given the address and the Respondent should have released the child”.
The Applicant raised the following allegations, that the Respondent abused alcohol, was on anti-depressants, neglected the minor child, had been suicidal and moved to a different place of residence, as well as changes to the minor child’s crèche more than four times. These were yet other issues in dispute.
To dispute the allegations of alcohol abuse, the Respondent went for an alcohol test at Ampath Laboratories in Gqeberha. The results were analysed and the following was stated:
“I conducted a 5-panel urine drug test, without warning, and accompanied the patient into the bathroom to avoid any possibility of tempering with the sample. This all came back negative for any use of amphetamines, cocaine, methamphetamines, opioids and THC (dagga).
I further also did a blood test on her that included 10 drugs of abuse (TIK included) as well as a blood ethanol level. This all came back negative for any abuse. The blood ethanol level was at 0.013 with a complete abstainer expected to have a level of 0.010. This is marginally higher than someone with no ethanol exposure, but not a level where any alcohol abuse or overuse would be suspected.”
The Judge found it rather concerning that the Respondent went for the test at 11h00 and at that time of the morning, she had alcohol levels of 0.013. but that the blood test results were sufficient and have proven that the Respondent was not an abuser. To the extent that the pathologist mentioned that the Respondent was accompanied to the bathroom to avoid tampering of the sample and even went as far as taking a blood sample, this was quite sufficient according to the Judge.
The issue raised by the Applicant that the Respondent was on anti-depressants and taking Cilift 20 mg daily, had been admitted. The Respondent indicated that this medication was prescribed since age seventeen (17) as she was diagnosed with depression. The Applicant could not use this against the Respondent as the Applicant already knew of the intake of Cilift 20mg when they were dating. The judge remarked: “The Respondent cannot be faulted for being on anti-depressant medication. In actual fact, the Respondent should be applauded for taking responsibility of her health instead of this being used against her”.
What was of serious concern to the Judge, was that was stated on page 16, para 17 of the Applicant’s founding affidavit. It read as follows:
“…I heard a very disconcerting sound coming from the child and I immediately ran to the room where the respondent and the child slept. When I came into the room, I saw the respondent covered the child’s face with a pillow and a blanket. When the respondent saw me in the room, she pulled the pillow and blanket away from the child. I immediately took the child away from her and tried to comfort her.”
The Respondent’s response to this was a vehement denial to the allegation levelled against her by the Applicant. In the Respondent’s answering on page 290, para 17, the following was stated:
“I find it odd that this incident was never mentioned before; in his application for contact rights in the Children’s Court…”
The Judge was of the view that the allegation that the Respondent left the minor child at an informal settlement and in the care of the paternal grandfather, who was at that stage was seventy-five (75) years old, amounted to the Respondent not acting in the best interest of the minor child.
MINOR CHILD’S STABILITY
The Respondent, had in short space of time and in the minor child’s two (2) years of life moved more than five times as well as changed the minor child’s crèches four times. This was quiet concerning to the court. The Respondent had not shown to move for better work opportunities or better accommodation. It appeared in the papers that the Respondent’s movement was in order to frustrate contact between the minor child and the Applicant. Section 7 (1) (k) of the Children’s Act provides as follows:
“the need for a child to be brought up within a stable family environment and, when this is not possible, in an environment resembling as closely as possible a caring family”.
Furthermore, the constant moving and changing of the minor child’s place of residence as well as the crèche, affected the minor child’s stability in terms of section 7(1)(k) of the Children’s Act, including the arrangement at the time of the hearing that the minor child attended crèche in Gqeberha for two weeks and then for two weeks the minor child was in Bethlehem. The minor child had to adjust to a new environment every two weeks. The Judge remarked: “The parties as parents should ask themselves, if they were in the position that they are putting the minor child in, would it be acceptable to either of them, to be shuttled every two weeks to a new environment? This arrangement in my view is not in the best interest of the minor child. Emphasis is on the minor child’s need for stability, be it her education or living arrangement”.
Of the two parents in the Judge’s view, the Applicant had shown to be the more stable parent. The Judge remarked: “The Respondent may have a stronger emotional bond with the minor child, but with the constant moving of the Respondent, the minor child at age three (3), needs a stable home and/or stable parent be it the mother or the father”.
MAJOR DECISIONS THAT AFFECT THE MINOR CHILD
The Judge referred to Section 31(2) of the Children’s Act and stated: “It is clear on major decisions that affect a minor child which cannot be made without due consideration of the views and wishes of the other co-holder of parental responsibilities and rights, which in this instance the Applicant bears these responsibilities”. The Respondent kept on relocating with the minor child without taking into consideration the views of the Applicant. In J v J 2008 (6) SA 30 (C) the Court considered, to what extent co-holders of parental responsibilities and rights can exercise these. The Court observed that under section 30 of the Children’s Act, co-holders of parental responsibilities and rights enjoy a large measure of autonomy.
With this constant relocation of the minor child, the Respondent should have had regard to the interruption of the bond between the Applicant and the minor child. In Jackson v Jackson 2002 (2) SA 303 (SCA) the Court emphasised the impact of relocation on the non-moving parent, and according to the Judge it should have been at the forefront of the relocating parent’s decision. Section 7 (1) (e) provides as follows in respect of contact with the minor child that:
“ the practical difficulty and expense of a child having contact with the parents, or any specific parent, and whether that difficulty or expense will substantially affect the child’s right to maintain personal relations and direct contact with the parents, or any specific parent on a regular basis“.
The Judge was of the view that the Respondent may have had the right to move freely in terms of Section 21 (1) of the Constitution, Act 108 of 1996 which provides that: “everyone has the right to freedom of movement.” However, the Respondent had to take into considerations the provisions of the Children’s Act if she had the intention to move and changes in residence as she did. The mere fact that the minor child had gone through four crèches, confirmed the instability that the child was exposed to. It was known that crèche attendance is the foundation phase of any child.
ALLEGATIONS RAISED BY THE RESPONDENT
The Respondent alleged that the Applicant failed to take the minor child off the nappy and the pacifier, failed to cut the minor child’s nails and maintain her hair. Furthermore, the Respondent alleged that the Applicant failed to communicate with her on issues that affected the child. Courts take a dim view when parents constantly raises allegations against each, in order to discredit each other. In the report of the Family Advocate, the following was noted with regard to the allegations:
“In considering the remaining allegations identified by both parties as highlighted in Mrs Van Der Westhuizen report, that informs a lack of parental capacity and that could have a negative impact on the child’s safety, well-being and best interests both parties have the necessary capacity to provide effective care for the child and the concerns raised are those that can be effectively addressed through further professional assistance should the parties not be in a position to resolve it themselves.”
BEST INTEREST OF THE MINOR CHILD
The Judge was of the view that the continuous litigation showed no consideration for what was in the best interest of the minor child. The best interests, standards and guidelines of the minor child are set out in section 7 of the Children’s Act. The Judge remarked: “It would probably be in the child’s best interest if parties could adhere to these principles. Equally so, it is that these principles were emphasised in McCall v McCall 1994 (3) SA 201 (C) where it was confirmed that it is the golden thread that runs through the best interests of a minor child”.
The Family Advocate in its first and second report, placed more emphasis on the emotional bond between the minor child and the Respondent. However, this was not the only factor to take into consideration, according to the Judge. A further factor that the Court had to take into consideration was, which parent was better able or more suitable to promote and ensure the child’s physical, intellectual, moral, emotional stability, security and safety. This list is not exhaustive as stated in McCall Supra.
A Court is called to weigh the competing advantages and disadvantages of the circumstances of both parents. In Ford v Ford, 2004 2 ALL SA 396 (W) – unreported Weiner, AJ suggested that it was unnecessary for the court to decide which of the two homes would be better. In Godbeer v Godbeer, 2000 (3) SA 976 (W) Nugent J went a step further and stated that: “The quality of [the children’s schooling, the relative standard of living and so forth are quite peripheral.”
The Judge took a deem view at the conduct of the Respondent, to the extent that she would leave the minor child in the care of a seventy-five (75) year old. This alluded to not taking into consideration the minor child’s safety, neither the minor child’s best interests.
After considering all the circumstances of both parents, in the Judges’ view the Applicant appeared to be the more stable parent and was able to provide the minor child with stability, safety, security, and proper accommodations. According to the Judge the Respondent did not have more or better parental responsibilities and rights. The parties had equal parental rights and responsibilities. The Respondent had been uncooperative since litigation started in Bethlehem. In the matter of Van der Linde v Van der Linde 1996 (3) SA 509 (O), the Court said the following:
“Die begrip ‘bemoedering’ is aanduidend van ‘n funksie eerder as ‘n persona en is hierdie funksie nie noodwendig geleë in die biologiese moeder nie. Dit behels die teergevoelige gehegtheid wat voortvloei uit die aandag wat van dag tot dag bestee word aan die kind se behoeftes aan liefde, fisieke versorging, voeding, vertroosting, gerustheid, geborgenheid, bemoediging en onderskraging. Alleenlik die ouer wat hierdie behoefte kan bevredig sal daarin slaag om ‘n psigologiese band met die kind te smee in welke ouer se sorg die kind kan ervaar dat sy bestaan nog veelbeduidend is, en wat met toegeneentheid beskut en beskerm word.”
PARENTAL ALIENATION
The Judge referred to the concept of Parental Alienation, a psychological manipulation of a child into demonstrating unwarranted fear, disrespect and hatred whereby one parent employs tactics such as criticizing the other parent; stop the child from having contact with the other parent. The Appellate Division in T v M, 1997 (1) SA 54 (A) acknowledged the dangers of Parental Alienation. In Soller Supra, the Court confirmed that Parental Alienation had occurred. The conduct of the Respondent on various occasions had been to frustrate contact between the child and the Applicant, to the extent that when the Respondent relocated to Gqeberha, she did not inform the Applicant that she was relocating with the minor child. In Qqeberha, the Applicant had to approach the Magistrate Court for assistance in order to exercise his parental responsibilities and rights. The Court went as far as to issue a warrant of arrest against the Respondent, whereupon the Applicant went to the South African Police to open a criminal case against the Respondent.
The Judge was of the view that Parental Alienation is a complex issue as one parent believes he or she is acting in the minor child’s best interests and stated: “Courts have to be conscious of any conduct of a parent who may in a subtle way alienate the other parent. Parental Alienation requires a close and careful scrutiny. The most common example of Parental Alienation is when a parent interferes or frustrate the other parent to exercise contact with the minor child”.
The Respondent told the presiding officer that the Children’s Court’s order of Bethlehem was fraudulently obtained whereby the presiding officer admonished the Respondent for making such serious allegations with regard to a court order that was properly obtained. The Court ordered the Respondent to have the minor child ready within two hours. The disrespect that the Respondent had shown towards the court orders confirmed that she did not act in the minor child’s best interest. The court order dated 16 April 2021 on page 126, went as far as to order as follows:
“The Applicant (C[….] L[….]) is directed to make contact with the Office of the Family Advocate, Bloemfontein, within a week of this order, to arrange for a meeting with the Family Advocate in order to assist with the investigation and to fully co-operate with the Family Advocate during such investigation, failing which the Applicant (C[….] L[….]) may be convicted of contempt of court.” The Respondent’s conduct was according to the Judge on the brink of Parental Alienation. The several court cases that the Applicant had to institute against the Respondent just so he could exercise contact with the minor child, was astonishing according to the Judge. Section 35(1) of the Children’s Act states as follows:
“Any person having care or custody of a child who, contrary to an order of any court or to a parental responsibilities and rights agreement that has taken effect as contemplated in section 22 (4), refuses another person who has access to that child or who holds parental responsibilities and rights in respect of that child in terms of that order or agreement to exercise such access or such responsibilities and rights or who prevents (my emphasis) that person from exercising such access or such responsibilities and rights is guilty of an offence and liable on conviction to a fine or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding one year“.
CONCLUSION
The Judge stated that it had been affirmed in several court decisions that the notion of mothers as primary care givers has diminished (Van der Linder Supra) and this to avoid unfair discrimination against either parent when deciding what is in the best interest of the minor child. The judge stated: “Even if the Court is the upper guardian over all minor children, however, it is with great difficulty that a Judge who does not know the child, except reading in the pleadings about the child, has to decide on what is in the child’s best interest as parents are emotionally unable to decide this for their child”.
The minor child was three (3) years. The volume of pleadings, with two arch lever files was disheartening according to the Judge. Of concern also for the Court, was the fact that the parties’ constant litigation could only meant that without proper parenting skills, this would not be the final matter before the court. The Jusge remarked: “However, it would be in the minor child’s best interest that as parents, parties attempt to go for mediation, or psycho-therapy”.
The Judge was of the view that the minor child’s best interests would be best served by the Applicant. The Applicant had shown (good cause) to be in a better position to take care of the minor child. The Applicant had shown stability and security for the minor child. The Court therefore did not follow the recommendation of the Family Advocate as it did not deal with the instability of the minor child and the obvious Parental Alienation, that was gradually being exercised by the Respondent as well as the instability which the Respondent had shown. The Judge made it clear that the Court is not bound by the recommendations of the Family Advocate.
The Applicant in the written Heads of Argument requested that the Respondent be ordered to return to Bethlehem. The Judge was of the view that the court could not order her to return to Bethlehem. That was, according to the Judge tantamount to interfering with her rights of freedom of movement. The Respondent had to make that decision on whether she wished to return to Bethlehem.
ORDER
The Court made the following order:
- It is declared that the parties are co-holders of parental responsibilities and rights in respect of the minor child;
- The Applicant was awarded care and primary residency of the child as contemplated in section 18(2)(a) read with sections 1, 18(3) and 21 of the Children’s Act 38 of 2005 (hereinafter referred to as “the Children’s Act”);
- The Respondent to have contact rights in respect of the child every alternative weekends from Friday 14h00 till Sunday 18h00.
- The Applicant was ordered to contribute half of the travelling expenses of the Respondent.
- The parties equally share in the long school holidays and the short school holidays were to alternate between the parties.
- The parties were to exercise three hours contact on the birthday of the minor child or that of the parties should such a day not coincide with the normal contact weekend or holiday.
- Contact on Father’s Day/Mother’s Day for three hours, if such a day did not coincide with the normal contact weekend or school holiday
- Regular telephonic/video call contact on a daily basis between the hours 16h00 till 19h00.
- The parties were ordered to approach a family mediator if any disputes arose that involved the minor child, before approaching court.
- The parties were ordered to attend parenting skills training, co-parenting and communication skills training.
- Each party had to pay their own costs.