The factual background and the parties’ competing claims
In H.L v B.L (2025/216979) [2026] ZAWCHC 350 (13 July 2026), the Western Cape High Court was required to determine an application for interim maintenance and a contribution towards legal costs under Rule 43 of the Uniform Rules of Court, 1965.
The parties were married on 3 January 2002 and had two minor children, who were 14 and 12 years old when the application was heard. Difficulties in the marriage arose towards the end of September 2023, when the applicant requested the respondent to leave the matrimonial bedroom. The parties subsequently attended marriage counselling from late 2023 until November 2024, but separated in December 2024 after their relationship had irretrievably broken down.
Although there were initially differences between the parties concerning the precise care and contact arrangements for the children, it was common cause that both parents would continue to play an active role in their lives. Their respective proposals effectively contemplated a shared-residence arrangement. They also agreed that school holidays would be divided by agreement at the beginning of each year or, failing agreement, shared equally between them.
The real dispute concerned money. The applicant alleged that the respondent had unilaterally and substantially reduced his financial contributions after the separation. She claimed that this left her unable to meet her own reasonable needs and those of the children. According to her, the respondent had also threatened to reduce or discontinue payments relating to domestic services and the children’s extramural activities.
The applicant initially sought cash maintenance of R59 100 per month. This was in addition to an extensive list of expenses which she wanted the respondent to pay directly. These included the bond instalment, municipal rates and taxes, water and electricity, levies, household insurance, domestic staff, medical aid and uncovered medical expenses, school and educational costs, extramural expenses and the costs associated with the motor vehicle in her possession. She also sought a contribution of R300 000 towards her legal costs in the pending divorce action.
The applicant stated that she earned an average of approximately R9 000 per month from freelance consulting, together with occasional income from project-based work. She maintained that she had no other regular or passive income and that her earnings were inconsistent and insufficient to meet the family’s needs. She contended that the respondent had the higher and more stable income and was legally obliged to bridge the shortfall in accordance with the standard of living enjoyed during the marriage.
The respondent did not deny his obligation to maintain the applicant and the children. He disputed the amount claimed and alleged that the applicant had understated her income, failed to disclose all her financial interests and materially overstated her monthly expenditure. He also contended that several expenses had been duplicated and that the applicant’s calculations did not properly credit him for the substantial expenses he continued to pay directly.
According to the respondent, the parties’ previous lifestyle had not been financed solely from recurring income. It had, at least in part, been sustained through debt and the proceeds of property sales. He argued that the former lifestyle was no longer affordable and that requiring him to meet the applicant’s demands could result in the sale of the matrimonial home, thereby diminishing the assets available to both parties and undermining the children’s longer-term security.
The respondent disclosed an average net monthly income of approximately R85 000, consisting of a basic net salary of R75 000 and an averaged monthly portion of an annual bonus. Against this, he disclosed monthly expenditure of approximately R79 200. This included the bond and municipal expenses relating to the matrimonial home, school fees, medical aid, vehicle expenses, insurance, his own accommodation after the separation and various household and personal expenses.
He also disclosed a pension fund, a share portfolio, limited cash savings, a motor vehicle and personal effects. His liabilities included the outstanding joint bond over the matrimonial home, vehicle finance, credit-card debt and a personal loan. He maintained that his pension and investments were not readily available without tax and other financial consequences and that his immediately accessible savings were limited.
Rather than refusing to provide maintenance, the respondent tendered cash maintenance of R25 000 per month, together with continued payment of specified expenses, including the bond and medical aid. His position was that this represented the maximum sustainable arrangement having regard to his income, liabilities and the expenses he was already meeting directly.
After the respondent delivered his opposing affidavit and identified several alleged deficiencies in the applicant’s financial disclosure, the applicant sought leave to file a supplementary affidavit under Rule 43(5) of the Uniform Rules of Court, 1965. The respondent initially objected, characterising the supplementary affidavit as an attempt to repair a deficient founding case shortly before the hearing, but later withdrew his opposition to its admission.
In her supplementary affidavit, the applicant addressed aspects of her business activities and earning capacity. She explained that she operated through Coconut Apps (Pty) Ltd and relied on a letter from the company’s accountant showing that the business had made losses during the 2024 and 2025 financial years and a relatively modest profit during the 2026 financial year. She said that no salary had been declared or paid to her during the latter two periods.
The applicant also acknowledged that her original maintenance schedule contained errors and instances of double-counting. She apologised and revised her monthly cash-maintenance requirement from R59 100 to approximately R44 000. The respondent nevertheless maintained that the revised amount remained excessive and that important questions concerning her income, business activities, liabilities and expenditure had still not been adequately answered.
The factual dispute before the court therefore extended beyond a simple comparison of the parties’ income and expenditure. It concerned the reliability of the applicant’s financial presentation, the respondent’s actual ability to pay, the affordability of the parties’ former standard of living and the extent to which the applicant could reasonably be expected to contribute towards her own support and that of the children.
Financial disclosure and the duty of utmost good faith
The central legal issue in the H.L case was whether the applicant had complied with the duty to make full and frank disclosure of her financial circumstances. Njokweni J described this as a duty of utmost good faith, or uberrima fides. The abbreviated nature of Rule 43 proceedings makes that duty particularly important because the court ordinarily determines interim relief on affidavit, without oral evidence, cross-examination or the extensive financial investigation available at trial.
The court relied on CMA v LA [2023] ZAGPJHC 364 at para 25 for the proposition that an applicant bears a mandatory obligation to make full and frank financial disclosure and that a failure to do so may result in the dismissal of the application. The principle is not confined to the omission of a major asset or an identifiable source of income. It extends to any material information required to determine the applicant’s actual need and the respondent’s ability to meet it.
In CA v HA (4478/2022) [2024] ZAWCHC 25, the court held that where an applicant is willing to omit facts from the founding affidavit, the court may be unable to trust that applicant to be candid about other, more substantial matters. Njokweni J applied that reasoning in assessing the applicant’s evidence as a whole. Once material aspects of a financial presentation are shown to be unreliable, the court is not obliged to accept the remaining figures merely because they appear in a sworn statement.
The applicant’s treatment of loans allegedly exceeding R840 000 was particularly damaging. In her founding affidavit, she said that it had been necessary to incur this debt to meet her and the children’s reasonable needs following the separation. The respondent demonstrated, however, that the bulk of the capital amounts had been advanced before the parties separated. In her supplementary affidavit, the applicant changed her explanation and said that the indebtedness dated back to 2016, when the parties had suffered financial difficulties after a builder allegedly stole their savings.
The court regarded the two versions as contradictory. The original version created the impression that the respondent’s post-separation conduct had forced the applicant to borrow substantial amounts merely to survive and to care for the children. The subsequent explanation showed that the debt had a materially different history. The court concluded that the original allegation had been presented to depict the respondent as financially abusive and to support a narrative which was “far from the truth”.
The problem was compounded by the applicant’s failure to identify precisely how much remained owing and to whom. Even after receiving an opportunity to supplement her evidence, she did not provide a complete account of the loans. The court was consequently unable to determine her true liabilities or assess whether the alleged indebtedness represented a legitimate monthly financial burden.
Njokweni J also considered income connected with the applicant’s professional activities. The respondent produced material from her website advertising a “reset course” for US$99, scheduled to run from 28 January to 18 February 2026. The supplementary affidavit was signed on the final day of the course, but did not disclose whether participants had enrolled or what revenue had been earned. The court considered the omission telling because the information was directly relevant to the applicant’s contention that her income-generating activities produced negligible returns.
This was not a situation in which the applicant could plausibly say that the income was unknown or that the respondent’s allegation had arisen too late for a response. By the time the supplementary affidavit was signed, the course had ended. Evidence of the enrolments and income should therefore have been available. As the court observed, disclosure of the information could either have supported or undermined the alleged need for maintenance. Silence prevented the court from making that determination.
Reliance on an accountant’s letter did not cure the problem. The letter referred to the company’s income, expenditure and assessed losses, but did not explain the underlying business expenses. Although supporting documents were mentioned, the relevant annual financial statements, tax assessments and source records were not placed before the court. The court was therefore asked to accept a broad financial summary without the material necessary to evaluate it.
Njokweni J referred to MNY v JY (2024/013982) [2024] ZAGPJHC 1823, which recognised that a court cannot quantify a maintenance need in the absence of full disclosure. The principle is practical rather than punitive. Maintenance is generally calculated by identifying reasonable expenditure, deducting the applicant’s available means and determining whether the respondent can afford the resulting shortfall. If the applicant’s means remain unknown, the calculation cannot reliably be completed.
The judgment further relied on J.M v S.M (2020/18792) [2025] ZAGPJHC 351 in explaining why the court cannot assume an investigative role. The J.M case recognises that the purpose of Rule 43 would be defeated if judges were required to uncover undisclosed assets, reconstruct incomplete accounts or verify unexplained transactions. The procedure is intended to be expeditious. Its proper functioning therefore depends upon litigants placing accurate and intelligible financial information before the court from the outset.
The duty rests on both parties. An applicant must prove a reasonable need, while a respondent who alleges an inability to pay must disclose sufficient information to establish that inability. Strategic vagueness by either spouse is inconsistent with the nature of the proceedings. Selective disclosure is equally objectionable: a party may not disclose unfavourable expenses while withholding income, or emphasise the other spouse’s assets while obscuring his or her own financial resources.
The H.L case also demonstrates that a supplementary affidavit is not necessarily an effective answer to defective disclosure. A litigant who is permitted to supplement must deal squarely with the identified omissions and provide verifiable information. General explanations, revised estimates and expressions of regret will carry little weight if the source documents and precise figures remain absent.
For practitioners, the broader warning is clear. Financial disclosure is not simply a procedural formality or an exercise in presenting the client’s case as favourably as possible. An affidavit which exaggerates need, understates income or creates a misleading chronology may cause the court to distrust the entire claim. The consequence may extend beyond the rejection of a disputed expense: it may prevent the court from finding that any quantifiable need has been established at all.
Reasonable maintenance, affordability and the limits of interim support
A spouse applying for maintenance pendente lite is not automatically entitled to the amount required to preserve every feature of the marital lifestyle. The enquiry is one of reasonableness, viewed in the context of the parties’ changed circumstances following separation.
In Taute v Taute 1974 (2) SA 675 (E), the court identified three central considerations: the standard of living enjoyed during the marriage, the applicant’s actual and reasonable requirements, and the respondent’s capacity to meet those requirements. Njokweni J applied this framework in the H.L case, observing that moderate and properly motivated claims are more persuasive than demands which appear extravagant or extortionate.
The marital standard of living therefore provides context, but not an immutable benchmark. Separation ordinarily creates two households where there was previously one. Accommodation, transport, utilities, insurance and personal expenses may all have to be duplicated. Unless the parties have considerable resources, maintaining precisely the same lifestyle in both households may be financially impossible.
A court must consequently distinguish between the standard previously enjoyed and the standard that can reasonably be sustained pending the divorce. Historical expenditure does not prove present affordability, particularly where the former lifestyle depended on credit, the depletion of investments or the proceeds of capital assets. The object of interim maintenance is to meet reasonable needs, not to preserve expenditure that the family can no longer afford.
The applicant’s reasonable requirements must also be separated from amounts that the respondent is paying directly. Where a respondent continues to meet expenses such as housing, medical aid, educational costs, insurance or vehicle expenses, those payments form part of the overall maintenance package. They cannot be disregarded merely because they are not paid to the applicant in cash. Otherwise, the same need may effectively be counted twice.
Affordability is a substantive limitation upon the relief that may be granted. In Buttner v Buttner 2006 (3) SA 23 (SCA); [2006] 1 All SA 429 (SCA), the Supreme Court of Appeal confirmed the importance of the maintenance debtor’s ability to pay. The Buttner case supports the proposition that even an objectively reasonable need cannot generate an order beyond the respondent’s financial capacity.
Income is ordinarily the starting point in assessing that capacity, although capital resources may sometimes be relevant. The existence of investments, pension interests or other assets does not, however, mean that they should automatically be liquidated to fund interim expenditure. The court must consider the nature of the asset, its accessibility, the tax or penalty consequences of realising it and the effect that depletion would have on the parties’ longer-term financial security.
The treatment of prospective bonus income illustrates this need for realism. The applicant argued that bonuses received in previous years were the best indication of what the respondent would earn in the future. The respondent’s evidence was that the relevant performance targets had not been achieved and that he did not expect a comparable bonus in 2026. A court determining interim maintenance must avoid treating uncertain, discretionary or performance-dependent remuneration as guaranteed income. Past receipt may be relevant, but it does not establish that the same amount will necessarily be available during the period governed by the order.
Njokweni J considered the respondent’s attitude towards his obligations significant. The evidence did not depict a spouse attempting to avoid supporting his family. It showed a respondent who accepted the existence of the duty of support and was prepared to meet substantial expenses within the limits of his available resources.
That approach accords with the observation in the Taute case that a respondent who demonstrates a willingness to meet lawful obligations is likely to carry greater credibility than one whose affidavit reflects an attempt to evade them. A reasonable tender does not determine the outcome, but it assists the court by providing a practical alternative to the relief claimed.
Earning capacity was another important consideration. The court found that the applicant appeared to have professional skills and the ability to generate income. The relevance of earning capacity lies in the reciprocal nature of the duty of support. Both parents must contribute towards the children according to their respective means, while an adult spouse who can reasonably contribute towards his or her own support cannot necessarily insist that the other spouse carry the entire burden.
Earning capacity should nevertheless be applied with care. It is not synonymous with actual earnings. A qualification, professional profile or previous work history may indicate potential, but does not prove the immediate availability of remunerative employment. The court must consider whether the spouse has been absent from the labour market, whether caregiving responsibilities restrict working hours, whether professional registration is required, and whether the asserted earning opportunity is realistically available.
In the H.L case, however, the concern was that the available material pointed to ongoing professional and commercial activity. The court was not dealing with a spouse who had no discernible means of entering the labour market. It therefore considered it reasonable to expect the applicant to reduce her dependence on the respondent and to contribute towards the reciprocal obligation to maintain the children.
Njokweni J referred to C.S v H.C.S [2025] ZAGPPHC 276, in which the Gauteng Division reaffirmed that the purpose of interim maintenance is to ensure fairness and give effect to the reciprocal duty of support, rather than to create an unjust, permanent-style “meal ticket”. The court also relied on S.J.J v M.M.J [2026] ZAGPJHC 57, which emphasised that Rule 43 provides temporary assistance and is not intended to operate as an indefinite financial safety net.
The expression “meal ticket” should not be detached from its context. It does not mean that a financially dependent spouse is undeserving of interim protection, nor does it displace the duty of support that continues until the marriage is dissolved. Its significance lies in the distinction between temporary assistance and indefinite dependency where a spouse has a realistic ability to become more self-supporting.
The court’s reasoning reflects an attempt to balance continuity with adjustment. Interim maintenance should prevent undue hardship and protect the economically weaker spouse while the divorce is pending. At the same time, it may legitimately encourage movement towards financial independence where the evidence demonstrates a genuine earning capacity.
The duration of the interim arrangement can be used to achieve that balance. A time-limited order does not necessarily terminate support regardless of future circumstances. It may create a period during which the recipient is expected to pursue available income-generating opportunities, while preserving the ability to return to court if those efforts do not produce a meaningful improvement or if circumstances deteriorate.
The H.L case accordingly treats maintenance pendente lite as a protective but measured remedy. The court must take account of the marital lifestyle without fossilising it, recognise need without ignoring earning capacity, and enforce the duty of support without imposing an obligation that the respondent cannot realistically perform.
The children’s interests and the court’s tailored interim order
The applicant’s conduct placed her personal claim for interim relief in considerable jeopardy. Njokweni J stated expressly that the court had initially been inclined to dismiss the application. That course was ultimately rejected because the application did not concern the spouses alone: it also implicated the maintenance and welfare of their two minor children.
The court therefore distinguished between its disapproval of the applicant’s conduct and the children’s entitlement to financial support. The children could not be prejudiced because the parent in whose care they would spend a substantial portion of their time had presented an unreliable case. Their material needs continued to exist independently of the deficiencies in the applicant’s evidence.
This aspect of the H.L case is important because it demonstrates that the consequences of litigation misconduct in family proceedings cannot always be imposed in the same manner as in an ordinary commercial dispute. Refusing all relief might have expressed the court’s disapproval of the applicant, but it could also have destabilised the children’s home, schooling, healthcare and daily living arrangements. The court instead formulated an order which preserved necessary support without endorsing the amount or duration of the claim advanced by the applicant.
The respondent was ordered to pay cash maintenance of R25 000 per month, without deduction or set-off. Payment was to be made on or before the first day of each month. The prohibition against deduction or set-off provides certainty and prevents unilateral adjustments which could leave the recipient household without the amount required for recurring expenses.
The cash component was only one part of the maintenance arrangement. The respondent was also ordered to continue paying the bond instalment on the matrimonial home, together with the rates, taxes and municipal services, including water and electricity. He was further required to pay the levies, household and homeowners’ insurance, security expenses and the reasonable costs of maintaining the property.
These direct payments ensured continuity in the children’s housing environment. They also reduced the risk that money intended for fixed household obligations would be diverted to other expenditure. From a practical perspective, an order combining cash maintenance with direct payment of identified expenses may be more effective than a single undifferentiated monthly amount. It identifies responsibility clearly and makes future disputes about compliance easier to determine.
Healthcare was dealt with separately. The respondent was ordered to retain the applicant and the children as dependants on his medical aid scheme and to pay reasonably incurred medical expenses not covered by the scheme. The order expressly included dental, pharmaceutical, surgical and hospital expenses. Payment to the service provider, or reimbursement where the expense had already been paid, had to take place within ten days after receipt of the relevant invoice.
The inclusion of a payment period is significant. Orders requiring a spouse to pay medical shortfalls frequently generate disputes about when reimbursement must occur. By specifying ten days, the court converted a general obligation into one capable of straightforward enforcement. The requirement that expenses be reasonably incurred also protected the respondent against open-ended liability while preserving adequate medical cover for the family.
The respondent was directed to pay the children’s reasonable educational costs directly to the relevant service providers. These costs included school fees, additional tuition, uniforms, books and textbooks. Direct payment protected the continuity of the children’s education and limited the possibility that disputes between the parents would result in arrears or interruptions.
The order did not expressly include every category of child-related expenditure initially placed before the court. In particular, it did not reproduce an unrestricted obligation to fund all extramural activities and associated expenses. The emphasis was instead placed on reasonable and identifiable educational requirements. This reflects the court’s broader concern that interim obligations should be sufficiently certain and financially sustainable.
The respondent was also ordered to pay the applicant’s motor vehicle insurance and the costs of licensing, maintenance, repairs and servicing. The order specifically extended to replacement tyres and wheel balancing. The vehicle-related relief appears directed towards ensuring that the applicant retained reliable transport for herself and the children without receiving an additional unrestricted cash amount for those expenses.
Njokweni J limited the operation of the maintenance order to a maximum of twelve calendar months from the date on which it was granted. This was not an order terminating the respondent’s obligations automatically and finally after a year. The applicant was granted leave, if her income did not improve or her circumstances worsened, to approach the court on the same papers, supplemented where necessary, for a variation.
That mechanism created an important safeguard. It placed an expectation upon the applicant to improve her financial position during the twelve-month period, but did not assume that she would necessarily succeed. If her reasonable efforts failed to produce greater income, the court retained the ability to reconsider the arrangement on updated evidence.
The leave to supplement would require the applicant to present reliable information about what had occurred during the intervening period. Any future application would be expected to explain her income-generating efforts, actual earnings, current expenditure and material changes in the children’s needs. The structure of the order therefore transformed future disclosure from a theoretical obligation into a practical condition for continued relief.
The limited duration also reduced the risk that a temporary order would operate for several years without reconsideration merely because the divorce trial had not been finalised. Delays in matrimonial litigation can cause an interim arrangement to acquire a permanence never contemplated when it was made. The twelve-month period ensured that the appropriateness of the maintenance regime could be tested against contemporary circumstances rather than remaining frozen until trial.
The court awarded a contribution of R40 000 towards the applicant’s legal costs, payable into her attorney’s trust account by 30 July 2026. Although markedly lower than the amount sought, the contribution recognised that the applicant required some financial assistance to participate in the pending divorce proceedings. A contribution towards costs is not intended to finance every aspect of a party’s preferred litigation strategy. It is an interim measure directed towards enabling meaningful access to legal representation, taking account of the issues in dispute and the parties’ respective resources.
Each party was ordered to pay his or her own costs of the Rule 43 application. The absence of a punitive costs order is consistent with the court’s attempt to fashion a solution directed towards future stability rather than further diminishing the resources available to the family. A substantial adverse costs order could ultimately have reduced the funds available for the children’s support.
The outcome of the H.L case was therefore neither an outright success nor a complete defeat for either spouse. The applicant did not obtain judicial endorsement of the maintenance regime she proposed, while the respondent remained responsible for an extensive combination of cash and direct payments. The result was a carefully bounded arrangement intended to protect the children, preserve essential household services and permit the applicant a period in which to improve her financial position.
The judgment’s broader significance lies in the court’s refusal to treat the children’s interests as inseparable from the merits of the applicant’s presentation. A court may reject the reliability of a parent’s case, rebuke that parent’s conduct and substantially reduce the relief claimed, while still ensuring that the children have an enforceable and workable maintenance structure. In this way, the H.L case illustrates the flexibility of Rule 43: the remedy can be tailored to protect children without rewarding an adult litigant whose approach to the proceedings fell short of the candour expected by the court.
Questions and Answers
What is the purpose of a Rule 43 application?
It provides prompt interim relief while divorce proceedings are pending. It may regulate maintenance, care and contact arrangements, payment of child-related expenses and a contribution towards legal costs until the divorce court determines the parties’ final rights.
Does a Rule 43 order finally determine the parties’ maintenance rights?
No. It is interlocutory and operates only pending the divorce or until varied. Findings made during the application do not necessarily bind the trial court, which will ordinarily have fuller evidence and may hear oral testimony.
What must an applicant establish when claiming interim spousal maintenance?
The applicant must demonstrate an actual and reasonable financial need. The court considers the lifestyle during the marriage, the applicant’s own resources and earning position, the reasonable monthly shortfall and the respondent’s capacity to meet it.
Does the marital standard of living determine the amount of maintenance?
It is relevant but not decisive. Separation generally creates two households and additional expenses, meaning that the former lifestyle may no longer be sustainable. The court must determine what is reasonable and affordable in the parties’ present circumstances.
Why is complete financial disclosure particularly important in these proceedings?
The procedure is ordinarily decided on affidavit without cross-examination or a full financial investigation. The court therefore depends upon accurate information about income, expenditure, assets and liabilities to determine whether a genuine shortfall exists.
Can a court refuse spousal maintenance because of material non-disclosure?
Yes. Material omissions, misleading allegations or deliberate exaggeration may justify refusing relief because the court cannot calculate a reliable maintenance need. Non-disclosure may also cause the court to distrust other aspects of the applicant’s evidence.
Will every mistake in an expense schedule result in the dismissal of the application?
Not necessarily. The court will consider the nature, extent and explanation for the mistake. An isolated and credibly explained error is different from repeated duplication, unexplained changes or inaccuracies that materially inflate the claim.
Can a supplementary affidavit repair an inadequate founding affidavit?
It may clarify new matters or provide information considered necessary by the court, but it is not an automatic opportunity to reconstruct the entire case. Where supplementation is allowed, the party should address the identified deficiencies directly and provide the relevant source documents.
Is the clean-hands principle absolute where minor children are affected?
No. Misconduct by a parent may undermine that parent’s personal claim, but the children retain independent rights to financial support. The court may therefore refuse or reduce relief sought for the spouse while still establishing a maintenance arrangement that protects the children.
How does the respondent’s ability to pay affect the enquiry?
Affordability is a substantive requirement. Even where a claimed expense is reasonable, the court cannot impose an obligation that exceeds the respondent’s available means. Income, unavoidable expenditure, liabilities and existing direct contributions must all be considered.
May a court take a respondent’s capital assets into account?
Yes, in appropriate circumstances, but the mere existence of capital does not mean it should be liquidated. The court may consider whether an asset is accessible, the consequences of realising it and whether depletion would prejudice the parties’ longer-term financial security.
How should uncertain bonuses or performance-related remuneration be treated?
Past bonuses may be relevant evidence, but they should not automatically be treated as guaranteed future income. The court must consider whether payment is discretionary, dependent upon performance targets or otherwise uncertain during the period covered by the interim order.
Can an applicant’s earning capacity reduce an interim maintenance award?
Yes, where there is reliable evidence that the applicant can reasonably contribute towards his or her own support. Earning capacity must nevertheless be assessed realistically and should not be equated automatically with immediate employment or actual income.
What is the purpose of a contribution towards legal costs?
It is intended to enable a financially weaker spouse to participate meaningfully in the divorce litigation. It does not necessarily place the parties in precisely equal financial positions or oblige the wealthier spouse to fund every aspect of the other party’s litigation strategy.
May an interim maintenance order be limited to a specified period?
Yes. A time-limited order may allow a spouse an opportunity to improve his or her financial position while preserving interim stability. The court may also permit a later variation application if income does not improve, financial circumstances worsen or the children’s reasonable needs materially change.
Written by Bertus Preller, a Family Law and Divorce Law attorney and Mediator at Maurice Phillips Wisenberg in Cape Town and founder of iDivorce and iANC. A blog, managed by SplashLaw, for more information on Family Law read more here. For free and useful Family Law tech applications visit Maintenance Calculator, Courtdaycalculator and Accrual Calculator.
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