This case concerns a divorced husband who asked the Free State High Court to declare that his duty to pay his former wife R25 000 per month in spousal maintenance ended when he paid the last instalment of her accrual claim, because the deed of settlement incorporated in the divorce order simply tied his maintenance to an existing rule 43 order. The court of first instance dismissed his application on the basis that a genuine dispute of fact existed. The Full Bench disagreed, interpreted the deed, held that the former wife’s version was far-fetched and untenable, and granted the declaratory order.
A Settlement Signed at the Court Door
In KIV v CJV (A151/2025) [2026] ZAFSHC 465 (15 October 2026) the parties had married out of community of property with the accrual system on 14 September 1996. When the marriage broke down the appellant instituted divorce proceedings in the Free State Division. The respondent brought a rule 43 application in October 2018 seeking, amongst other relief, interim maintenance of R30 000 per month. On 22 November 2018 Chesiwe J ordered the appellant to pay the respondent pendente lite maintenance of R25 000 per month.
The divorce action was set down for 4 December 2018. Before the matter was called, the appellant’s erstwhile attorney handed him a draft deed of settlement, which he read and signed. The deed left the respondent’s accrual claim to stand over for later adjudication. On spousal maintenance it provided only that the plaintiff “shall pay maintenance to the defendant in respect of her personal maintenance …. in accordance with the existing rule 43 order”. The respondent signed as well, the court dissolved the marriage and the deed was made an order of court.
The accrual claim then became, in the words of the Full Bench, “a protracted and very complicated process” that was only finalised in November 2020, when the respondent’s accrual entitlement was fixed at R4 579 919. The appellant paid that sum in instalments from January 2021 and made the final payment on 29 March 2021. Throughout, he kept paying the R25 000 per month, on his understanding that the divorce proceedings only ended once the accrual was determined and paid. When the last accrual payment was made, he regarded his maintenance obligation under the rule 43 order, read with the divorce order, as discharged. The respondent took the opposite view, contending that the maintenance term was a final term with no termination date and that she was entitled to lifelong maintenance. On 11 December 2024 the appellant launched an application for a declaratory order to that effect.
The Court a Quo and the Dispute of Fact
Boonzaaier AJ dismissed the application with costs on 24 April 2025. She found that a material dispute of fact existed on the papers which could not be resolved on affidavit, that the respondent had raised a bona fide defence, and that the dispute had been foreseeable before the application was launched. In her view the appellant ought to have applied for a referral to oral evidence as soon as the dispute became evident and before full argument was heard. Because the appellant bore the onus, he had failed to prove his case. She refused leave to appeal, but subsequently granted leave to a Full Bench of the Division on 7 August 2025.
The Full Bench, in a judgment by Loubser J with Daffue and Reinders JJ concurring, approached the appeal by returning to what it called the “clear and firmly established principles of our law” governing final relief in motion proceedings. Where a respondent raises a real and genuine dispute of fact, the respondent’s version must prevail unless the court is of the opinion that the version “is not such as to raise a real, genuine or bona fide dispute of fact or is so far-fetched or clearly untenable that the court is justified in rejecting that version merely on the papers”. The court cited Plascon-Evans Paints Ltd v Van Riebeeck Paints (Pty) Ltd 1984 (3) SA 623 (A) at 634E to 635C and Wightman t/a J W Construction v Headfour (Pty) Ltd [2008] ZASCA 6; [2008] 2 All SA 512 (SCA); 2008 (3) SA 371 (SCA) at paragraph 12 for that proposition, and added, with reference to paragraph 13 of Wightman, that a real, genuine and bona fide dispute of fact can exist only where the court is satisfied that the party purporting to raise it has in his affidavit seriously and unambiguously addressed the fact said to be disputed.
The decisive point in the court’s reasoning is that whether a genuine dispute of fact existed could not be answered in the abstract. The appellant plainly sought final relief, so the Plascon-Evans approach applied. But the question whether the respondent’s version raised a real dispute could, in the court’s words, not “be decided without reference to the specific terms of the deed of settlement”. The existence of a dispute of fact therefore collapsed into a question of interpretation: if the deed meant what the appellant said it meant, the respondent’s contrary version could not be a bona fide dispute at all.
Interpreting the Deed: Grammar, Context and Purpose
The court applied the approach to interpretation set out at paragraph 18 of Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality [2012] ZASCA 13; [2012] 2 All SA 262 (SCA); 2012 (4) SA 593 (SCA), quoting the well-known passage that interpretation “is the process of attributing meaning to the words in a document … having regard to the context provided by reading the particular provision or provisions in the light of the document as a whole and the circumstances attendant upon its coming into existence”, that “[t]he process is objective not subjective”, and that “[a] sensible meaning is to be preferred to one that leads to insensible or unbusinesslike results or undermines the apparent purpose of the document”.
Starting with the ordinary grammatical meaning, the court found the language of the deed “without any doubt clear and unambiguous”. The maintenance was payable pendente lite, which, according to the Trilingual Legal Dictionary of Hiemstra and Gonin, means pending the suit. The payment was therefore “a temporary measure existing until the conclusion of the divorce proceedings between the parties”. Context confirmed that reading. The same deed provided that the accrual claim would stand over for later determination, so the divorce litigation would only end when the accrual claim was determined. At the time of signature nobody knew how large the accrual award would be, and the court found it would “make sense to provide for temporary maintenance until the amount of accrual becomes known, because that amount could be expected to have an influence on the amount of further maintenance to be paid by the appellant, if at all”.
Measured against that reading, the respondent’s contentions that maintenance had been settled as a final term with no termination date, and that the parties never intended it to cease on payment of the accrual, were found to “fly in the face of the clear terms of the deed of settlement”. She relied on allegations that were not endorsed by the deed she had signed. The court held that her version “made no sense at all, and ought to have been rejected as far-fetched and untenable”. It followed that the court a quo should have found that no real, genuine and bona fide dispute of fact had been raised, that the appellant had proved his case, and that he had no reason to foresee that a genuine factual dispute would arise in the motion proceedings he initiated.
Foreseeability, Costs and the Practical Lessons
The court dealt separately with the finding that the appellant should have anticipated a factual dispute and proceeded by action or sought a referral to oral evidence. Two without prejudice letters from the respondent’s attorneys were decisive. In August 2017 they proposed that the appellant pay rehabilitative maintenance of R18 000 per month for 24 months from the date of divorce. On 10 September 2020, before the accrual had been finalised, they recorded the respondent’s willingness to accept temporary spousal maintenance for a period of 12 months. Against the background of those proposals the court held that it could not be found that the appellant should have foreseen a real and genuine factual dispute about the period of maintenance when he approached the court on motion.
On costs the court declined the appellant’s invitation to award attorney and client costs. The papers showed that the relationship between the parties had become acrimonious because of a relationship between the appellant and a third party, which the court described as the main cause of the breakdown of the marriage. Loubser J held that “the likely emotional impact of these events on the respondent should not be underrated, and therefore she should not be blamed for opposing the application by imposing a punitive order of costs”. Party and party costs, including counsel’s fees on scale B, were ordered in both courts, together with the costs of the application for leave to appeal.
The appeal was upheld and the order of the court a quo was replaced with a declaration that the appellant’s maintenance obligations towards the respondent in her personal capacity “persisted only until the date of final payment of the respondent’s claim for accrual, being 29 March 2021”. For practitioners the judgment carries two distinct lessons. The first is a drafting lesson. A maintenance clause that simply incorporates an existing rule 43 order imports the temporary, pendente lite character of that order, and where the accrual or any other issue stands over, the end of the litigation, not the date of the decree, is the end of the maintenance. A client who wants post-divorce maintenance must have it stated in express terms, with its amount, duration and any escalation or termination events. The second is a procedural lesson. A respondent cannot defeat motion proceedings merely by asserting a dispute of fact. Where the dispute is about the meaning of a written instrument and the asserted version contradicts the plain terms of that instrument, the court will interpret the document on the papers and reject the contrary version as untenable, and prior settlement correspondence consistent with the applicant’s reading will weigh heavily against any suggestion that the dispute was foreseeable.
Questions and Answers
What was the central question before the Full Bench?
Whether the court a quo was correct in finding that the respondent had raised a real, genuine and bona fide dispute of fact that prevented the appellant from obtaining a final declaratory order in motion proceedings about the duration of his maintenance obligation.
What did the deed of settlement say about spousal maintenance?
It provided only that the plaintiff shall pay maintenance to the defendant in respect of her personal maintenance in accordance with the existing rule 43 order. It contained no separate amount, duration or termination date.
Why did the appellant contend that his maintenance obligation ended on 29 March 2021?
The rule 43 order was pendente lite, meaning pending the suit. Because the accrual claim stood over under the deed, the divorce litigation only ended when the accrual was finally determined and paid. The last accrual payment was made on 29 March 2021.
What was the respondent’s position?
That maintenance had been settled as a final term with no termination date, that it was never the common intention of the parties that it would cease on payment of the accrual, and that she was entitled to lifelong maintenance.
On what grounds did the court a quo dismiss the application?
Boonzaaier AJ found a material and foreseeable dispute of fact that could not be resolved on the papers, held that the appellant should have sought a referral to oral evidence before full argument, and concluded that he had failed to discharge his onus.
Which test governs final relief in motion proceedings where facts are disputed?
The test in Plascon-Evans, as confirmed in Wightman. The respondent’s version prevails unless it does not raise a real, genuine or bona fide dispute of fact or is so far-fetched or clearly untenable that the court is justified in rejecting it on the papers.
When is a dispute of fact real, genuine and bona fide?
According to paragraph 13 of Wightman, as applied by the Full Bench, only where the court is satisfied that the party raising the dispute has in his or her affidavit seriously and unambiguously addressed the fact said to be disputed.
How did the question of a dispute of fact become a question of interpretation?
The court held that whether the respondent’s version raised a genuine dispute could not be decided without reference to the specific terms of the deed of settlement. Once the deed was interpreted, a version contradicting its clear terms could not amount to a bona fide dispute.
Which approach to interpretation did the court apply?
The approach in paragraph 18 of Endumeni: meaning is attributed to the words in light of the document as a whole and the circumstances of its creation, the process is objective, and a sensible meaning is preferred to one producing insensible or unbusinesslike results.
What meaning did the court give to pendente lite?
Relying on the Trilingual Legal Dictionary of Hiemstra and Gonin, pending the suit. Maintenance payable in accordance with a pendente lite order is therefore a temporary measure that exists until the conclusion of the proceedings.
What contextual factor supported the appellant’s interpretation?
The deed left the accrual claim to stand over. Because the size of the accrual award was unknown at signature and could be expected to affect what further maintenance, if any, should be paid, it made sense to provide temporary maintenance only until the accrual was known.
Why did the Full Bench find that the dispute was not foreseeable?
Without prejudice letters from the respondent’s attorneys in August 2017 and September 2020 had proposed rehabilitative maintenance for 24 months and temporary maintenance for 12 months respectively. Those proposals were inconsistent with any genuine belief in lifelong maintenance.
What order did the Full Bench substitute?
A declaration that the appellant’s maintenance obligations towards the respondent in her personal capacity persisted only until the date of final payment of the accrual claim, being 29 March 2021, with costs of the application on the party and party scale including counsel’s fees on scale B.
Why did the court refuse a punitive costs order?
The marriage had broken down because of the appellant’s relationship with a third party. The court held that the likely emotional impact on the respondent should not be underrated and that she should not be blamed for opposing the application by imposing attorney and client costs.
What should practitioners take from the judgment when drafting settlement agreements?
Incorporating a rule 43 order by reference imports its temporary character. If post-divorce spousal maintenance is intended, the agreement must say so expressly and specify the amount, duration, any escalation and the events on which the obligation ends, particularly where the accrual or other issues stand over.
Written by Bertus Preller, a Family Law and Divorce Law attorney and Mediator at Maurice Phillips Wisenberg in Cape Town and founder of iDivorce and iANC. A blog, managed by SplashLaw, for more information on Family Law read more here. For free and useful Family Law tech applications visit Maintenance Calculator, Court Day Calculator and Accrual Calculator.
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