MB v LB (2025-047348) [2026] ZAWCHC 707 (19 November 2026) is about a mother who would not undertake to use her best endeavours to keep her daughter in telephonic contact with the child’s father during a December 2026 holiday in the United States of America. The Western Cape High Court, per Wille J, compelled her to do so and ordered her to pay costs, partly on the attorney and client scale.
The facts: a holiday planned, cancelled and never really cancelled
The applicant (the father) and the respondent (the mother) are the parents of a daughter, T, born on 28 August 2014. A parenting plan concluded on 2 August 2021 provides for daily telephonic contact between the father and T. The matter first served before Wille J about eighteen months earlier, when the relief was different but the theme of alleged parental alienation was already present. On 6 May 2025 the court appointed two clinical psychologists to conduct a care and contact assessment, which was to include an investigation into the alleged alienation, directed both parents to attend a parenting skills course, directed the parties to request Ms Claire Yarde-Leavett, a reunification specialist, to facilitate weekly in-person contact and school drop-offs until the parenting plan regime was restored, and restrained the mother from prescribing to T what she could discuss or do with her father. That order also provided that, should the mother fail to facilitate contact, the father could apply on the same papers, duly supplemented, for a variation of the interim contact regime or “such other order as the above Honourable Court deems fit”.
The mother planned to take T to the United States from 3 December 2026 to 28 December 2026, a trip T described as about a week in New York followed by a stay at Disney World. The father never refused his consent. He asked only that the mother undertake to use her best endeavours to facilitate his telephonic contact with T while they were away. She would not give that undertaking and never explained why. Instead she set deadlines for his written consent and, once the last had passed, informed him on 26 October 2026 that she would travel on her own and asked him to arrange for T to attend a camp. The father tried to resolve matters through correspondence and with the help of Ms Yarde-Leavett, but the mother would not allow T to attend the meeting he arranged, which clashed with a drama class, and proposed no alternative date. The application followed shortly afterwards and the mother opposed it on 29 October 2026.
When T consulted her legal representative, Ms Hannington, on 5 November 2026 it emerged that T’s trip had never been cancelled. At the hearing on 9 November 2026 the mother tendered a draft order in terms of which the father would sign the travel consents within five days, failing which the Sheriff would sign for him, she would “actively encourage and facilitate” telephonic or video contact at least three times a week at times convenient to T, T could initiate contact whenever she wished, and the father would pay her costs on the attorney and client scale. The father rejected the tender. The order was granted on 11 November 2026, substantially in terms of the notice of motion, and the reasons followed on 19 November 2026 after they were requested.
Same case, same judge and still urgent: the procedural objections
The mother’s first objection was that the application should not have been brought under the existing case number or placed before the same judge. The court disagreed. The file had been retained in accordance with the division’s practice directives, the application was brought expressly under a prayer of the May 2025 order, and it was a continuation of the same matter.
Her second objection was urgency. The application was heard as one of urgency in terms of Rule 6(12) of the Uniform Rules of Court. The court reasoned that the dispute had to be decided well before the planned departure, which was just over three weeks away when the matter was argued, and that matters concerning the well-being of children will often call for urgent determination. It also relied on section 6(4)(b) of the Children’s Act 38 of 2005, which requires a conciliatory approach and that delay be avoided as far as possible. The argument was further undermined by the mother’s own conduct, since she had imposed strict deadlines on the father and then announced that she would travel without T. When the application was launched the father reasonably believed that cancellation of T’s trip was under way or imminent, and he could not be faulted for moving quickly.
Her third objection was that the relief was unprecedented. The court held that it was not, because courts frequently attach reasonable contact conditions to a parent’s travel abroad with a child. In any event the High Court is the upper guardian of minor children, and section 28(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 makes a child’s best interests of paramount importance in every matter concerning the child. The court described its approach in such matters as inquisitorial, so that it may have regard to any relevant information placed before it, and it assessed the relief through the lens of T’s best interests rather than the preferences of either parent.
Neutrality is not facilitation: the reasoning on contact
Wille J located the crux of the case in the mother’s refusal to accept any responsibility for facilitating contact. Her position was that it was unnecessary and onerous for her and T to “battle each day” to arrange a call, that the daily calls were rigid and anxiety-inducing obligations on T, and that she would accommodate a call if T wished to speak to her father. The court found that this description was not borne out, as Ms Hannington reported that T was not concerned or anxious about communicating with her father while abroad. More fundamentally, the parenting plan confers a right to daily contact that does not depend on the child’s inclination on a given day, and the parent with whom the child is travelling must facilitate it. Using best endeavours, the court noted, involves encouragement, structure and the ordinary incentives parents use with children.
The expert evidence pointed the same way. Mr Altman, the father’s expert, considered that the mother’s stance of not “forcing” T allowed the child’s anxiety and avoidance to become the effective determinant of contact. He did not regard this on its own as establishing deliberate alienation, but he regarded it as clinically significant and warned that, where a child is vulnerable to loyalty conflict, parental non-intervention may reinforce the child’s sense that contact with the other parent is unsafe, optional or emotionally fraught. Mr Dowdall, the mother’s own expert, found that T does not present with a parental alienation picture but acknowledged elements of alienation in the mother’s behaviour at times, and noted that once T was told that the court had ordered contact she quickly resumed a warm relationship with her father. The court found that observation telling because, on the evidence, “what has helped T in the past is structure, not choice” (para 25).
The judgment makes no final finding on parental alienation, which was not an issue requiring determination at this stage, but it records that the case exhibits many features akin to it. The court observed that in such cases the alienating parent often professes neutrality, insisting that the child make her own decisions about contact and cannot be forced, and that too little emphasis is placed on the negative psychological effects on the child of rejecting a parent. Whatever label is ultimately attached, an approach of this kind was held not to be in T’s best interests and to be “the antithesis of co-parenting” (para 4). The court was also troubled by the mother’s statement on affidavit that it was “not safe” for her to attend T’s Bat Mitzvah and that she stayed away to protect herself and T from the father. No facts were given, and unexplained statements of this kind risk conveying to a child that the other parent is someone from whom she needs protection.
Against that background the tender could not suffice. Three calls a week fell short of the daily contact in the parenting plan, the timing was subject to T’s convenience, and there was no obligation on the mother to ensure that T answered her father’s calls. In substance the tender left contact to T’s choice, “which is the very problem” (para 27). The tender was moreover qualified by the mother’s claim that her budget had been depleted, an allegation the court called bald and unsubstantiated in the absence of any disclosure of her financial position. Her version that she had told T she would travel alone, and that T was angry, could not be reconciled with what T told Ms Hannington, was not accepted, and cast serious doubt on the genuineness of the tender.
The order therefore compels the mother, insofar as she travels, to take T with her and to use her best endeavours to ensure that T speaks to her father telephonically at least once every 36 hours, answers his calls, and sends him visual updates of the holiday by WhatsApp at least once every 36 hours. The mother must answer the father’s communications about T within 36 hours, report any emergency immediately, keep her own phone switched on, charged and enabled for roaming, take T’s iPad along and keep it charged, and ensure that an Apple AirTag is attached to T whenever she leaves the place where they are staying. The itinerary, accommodation addresses, the names and telephone numbers of the people with whom they will stay and the internal flight details had to be furnished within 36 hours of the order, whereupon the father was to sign the travel documents. If the father hears nothing from the mother or T for 48 hours and cannot reach them, he may approach the court for urgent relief on the same papers. Ms Yarde-Leavett, an educational psychologist with a good rapport with T, was appointed as T’s therapist at the parties’ shared cost despite the mother’s unexplained objection, and the mother must ensure that T attends the sessions save in exceptional circumstances.
The mother’s stated fear of contempt was held to be misplaced. The contact relief requires best endeavours and not a guarantee, so a parent who genuinely uses her best endeavours is at no risk of contempt, while the remaining obligations are practical steps wholly within her own control.
Costs: the price of unsupported allegations on oath
The costs order has three parts. The mother must pay the costs of T’s legal representative on the party and party scale (Scale B). She had appointed Ms Hannington as T’s legal representative, and Ms Hannington’s participation in this round was occasioned by the mother’s refusal to facilitate contact. The mother must also pay the father’s costs, including the costs of two counsel, on the party and party scale from the inception of the matter until 29 October 2026, with senior counsel on Scale C and junior counsel on Scale B, and on the attorney and client scale thereafter. The dividing date is the date on which she opposed the application, by which time, in the court’s view, it must have dawned on her that her case was hopeless.
Wille J was explicit that a punitive order is not warranted merely because opposition fails. It was warranted here because of the manner in which the opposition was conducted. The mother placed sworn averments and denials before the court that had no reasonable factual foundation, persisted in a defence that was hopeless in law and on the facts, and filled the gaps in her case with speculation and bare denials. She alleged that the application was brought in bad faith to harass, control and intimidate her, and accused the father of bullying and financial intimidation, without supporting facts. She claimed that his true aim was to avoid having T in his care over December or to avoid the cost of a camp, when he was happy to have T and had always paid for camps. She accused him of punching a young child, which the court called completely unjustified. She complained that his attorneys had met Ms Yarde-Leavett unilaterally, when the record showed that notice was given to her attorney on 13 September 2026, the meeting took place on 18 September 2026 without objection, and it was confirmed in writing on 25 September 2026.
On the law, the court recorded that costs lie in its discretion, to be exercised judicially on a consideration of all the facts. Citing Public Protector v South African Reserve Bank 2019 (6) SA 253 (CC) at paras 220 to 226, it stated that attorney and client costs are awarded where a party has conducted litigation in a manner that is vexatious, reckless, frivolous, dishonest, mala fide or otherwise an abuse of the process of court, and that proof of subjective bad faith is not required because objectively unreasonable or reckless conduct may suffice. Citing Nel v Waterberg Landbouwers Ko-operatieve Vereeniging 1946 AD 597 at 607, it identified the two purposes of a punitive order, namely to indemnify the successful party more fully against expenses that should never have been incurred and to mark the court’s disapproval of conduct that undermines the integrity of its process.
Applying Public Protector and Nel, the court found that the mother’s conduct, viewed cumulatively, had put the father to substantial and unnecessary expense, occupied the court’s time with disputes that were not genuine, and undermined the trust a court is entitled to place in sworn evidence. A party and party order for the whole matter would have left the father out of pocket and would not have signalled the court’s disapproval. The employment of two counsel was justified by the urgency of the matter, its history and the expert evidence that had to be addressed.
Questions and Answers
What was the central issue in the MB case?
Although the application was framed around telephonic contact during an overseas holiday, the court identified the real issue as the mother’s refusal to accept any responsibility for facilitating contact between the child and her father, and whether that stance served the child’s best interests.
On what basis could the father approach the same judge under the existing case number?
The order of 6 May 2025 expressly allowed him to apply on the same papers, duly supplemented, if the mother did not facilitate contact, and permitted such other order as the court deemed fit. The file had been retained under the division’s practice directives, and the application was treated as a continuation of the same matter.
Why did the application qualify for an urgent hearing under Rule 6(12)?
The dispute had to be decided well before the departure date of 3 December 2026, which was just over three weeks away when the matter was argued. The court held that matters concerning the well-being of children will often call for urgent determination. The mother had herself imposed strict deadlines on the father, and he reasonably believed that the child’s trip was being cancelled, so he could not be faulted for invoking Rule 6(12).
What does section 6(4)(b) of the Children’s Act require in a matter concerning a child?
As applied in the MB case, section 6(4)(b) of the Children’s Act requires a conciliatory approach and that delay be avoided as far as possible. The court relied on it as a further reason why the application had to be determined urgently.
Was it unprecedented to attach contact conditions to a parent’s overseas holiday with a child?
No. The court held that in these types of cases courts frequently attach reasonable contact conditions to a parent’s travel abroad with a child. In any event the High Court acts as upper guardian of minor children.
What role did section 28(2) of the Constitution play in the reasoning?
Section 28(2) makes a child’s best interests of paramount importance in every matter concerning the child. The court used the child’s best interests, rather than the preferences of either parent, as the lens through which all the relief was assessed.
How does a court approach the evidence in a matter concerning a child?
The court described its approach as inquisitorial. It may have regard to any relevant information placed before it, which in this matter included the report of the child’s legal representative and the views of both parents’ experts.
Does a contact right in a parenting plan depend on whether the child feels like making contact?
No. The court held that the parenting plan confers a right to daily contact which does not depend on the child’s inclination on a given day. The parent with whom the child is travelling must facilitate that contact.
What does an obligation to use best endeavours to secure contact require of a parent?
According to the judgment, using best endeavours involves encouragement, structure and the ordinary incentives parents use with children. It requires active steps by the parent and is not satisfied by merely permitting contact if the child asks for it.
Does a best endeavours order expose the travelling parent to contempt if the child will not co-operate?
The court held that such a fear is misplaced. The contact relief requires best endeavours and not a guarantee, so a parent who genuinely uses her best endeavours to secure contact is at no risk of contempt. The other obligations in the order are practical steps that lie wholly within that parent’s control.
Did the court find that the mother was guilty of parental alienation?
No final finding was made, because the question did not need to be determined at this stage. The court nevertheless recorded that the case exhibits many features akin to parental alienation and that the mother’s professed neutrality was not in the child’s best interests and was the antithesis of co-parenting.
Why was the mother’s tender of contact at least three times a week inadequate?
It fell short of the daily contact for which the parenting plan provides, made the timing of contact subject to the child’s convenience, and imposed no obligation on the mother to ensure that the child answered her father’s calls. In substance it left contact to the child’s choice, which the court regarded as the very problem.
How did the expert evidence influence the outcome?
The father’s expert regarded the mother’s refusal to “force” contact as clinically significant, because it allowed the child’s anxiety and avoidance to determine contact. The mother’s own expert acknowledged elements of alienation in her behaviour at times and noted that the child quickly resumed a warm relationship with her father once told that the court had ordered contact. The court concluded that structure, not choice, is what had helped the child.
When will a court award costs on the attorney and client scale, and must bad faith be proved?
Relying on Public Protector, the court stated that such costs are awarded where litigation has been conducted in a manner that is vexatious, reckless, frivolous, dishonest, mala fide or otherwise an abuse of process. Proof of subjective bad faith is not required, since objectively unreasonable or reckless conduct may suffice. Relying on Nel, it added that a punitive order both indemnifies the successful party more fully and marks the court’s disapproval.
Why was the punitive scale applied only from 29 October 2026, and who pays for the child’s legal representative?
29 October 2026 was the date on which the mother opposed the application, and the court considered that by then it must have dawned on her that her case was hopeless. Costs before that date were awarded on the party and party scale. The mother was also ordered to pay the costs of the child’s legal representative on the party and party scale, because that representative’s participation was occasioned by the mother’s refusal to facilitate contact.
Written by Bertus Preller, a Family Law and Divorce Law attorney and Mediator at Maurice Phillips Wisenberg in Cape Town and founder of iDivorce and iANC. A blog, managed by SplashLaw, for more information on Family Law read more here. For free and useful Family Law tech applications visit Maintenance Calculator, Court Day Calculator and Accrual Calculator.
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